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Understanding Admissibility of Prior
Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic
Approach
WILLIAM ROTH*
One of the most misunderstood areas of evidence in criminal cases is the
admissibility of a defendant's prior bad acts. This article discusses both
the practical and theoretical perspectives of prior bad acts and presents a
diagram of the different admissibility theories. This visual aid is a great
step forward in simplifying this problematic area.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most litigated area of evidence, concerns the admissibility
of prior2 bad acts committed by a criminal defendant. In Califor-
nia, the operative provision is section 1101(b) of the Evidence
Code.3 While much has been written on the subject,4 courts and
* B.A. University of California, Santa Barbara, 1964; J.D. University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, 1967; Associate Professor, Detroit College of Law.
1. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[08], at 404-47
(1981) ("more decisions than occasioned by any other single rule").
2. The word "prior" in this context refers to acts committed before the in
court testimony describing them, whether the acts occurred before or after the
date of the charged offense and whether these previous acts resulted in arrest or
conviction. Acts occurring after a particular date are just as relevant as similar
acts occurring before that date, see Waller v. United States, 177 F.2d 171, 175-76
(9th Cir. 1949); B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK § 21.4 (1972), un-
less the issue is that of knowledge at the time of the charged act. Waller v. United
States, 177 F.2d at 176.
3. This article will focus primarily on the law in California, although the con-
cepts and problems are similar throughout the United States, both state and fed-
eral. See FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee note.
CAL. EvD. CODE § 1101 (West 1966) provides:
(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102 and 1103, evi-
dence of a person's character or a trait of his character (whether in
the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his
conduct on a specified occasion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to
prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident) other
than his disposition to commit such acts.
(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to
support or attack the credibility of a witness.
The Federal Rule of Evidence analogous to section 1101 is Rule 404 which
provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that
he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his char-
acter offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecu-
tion to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peace-
fulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in comformity therewith. It may, however, be ad-
missible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
FED. R. EvD. 404. The federal cases are collected and discussed in S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAUAL 129-45 (2d ed. 1977) and 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 404.
Strictly speaking, CAL. Ev.D. CODE § 1101(b) and FED. R. EVID. 404(b) are not ad-
missibility sections at all, but merely provisions clarifying their respective first
subdivisions. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 404[08], at 404-45:
Rule 404(b) which admits evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts for pur-
poses other than to show that a person acted in conformity with his char-
acter is not an exception to Rule 404(a) since Rule 404(a) does not apply
when criminal propensity is not used circumstantially as the basis for in-
ferring an act. [citation omitted.) Rule 404(b) is redundant; it appears as
a rule, although the result would have been the same in its absence, to
alert the reader to this avenue of admitting evidence of other criminal
acts, and to detail the most usual instances in which admissibility may be
achieved.
While CAL. EvrD. CODE § 1101 does not distinguish between civil and criminal
cases, the issue of the admissibility of prior bad acts will usually arise only in the
context of a criminal proceeding. The reason is that criminal defendants often
have in fact committed prior bad acts and prosecutors are desirous of bringing
them to the attention of the jury-albeit more for their prejudicial effect than their
evidentiary relevance. Cf. B. JEFFERSON, supra note 2, § 21.3, at 263 ("the prosecu-
tion will always claim that the evidence is relevant to prove, and is being offered to
prove, some fact other than that of defendant's disposition to commit [similar]
criminal acts" (emphasis in original)). For a discussion of the admissibility of
similar facts evidence in civil cases, see Comment, Similar Facts Evidence: Bal-
ancing Probative Value Against the Probable Dangers of Admission, 9 U.C.D. L.
REV. 395 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L REV. 325
(1956); Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv.
L. REV. 988 (1938); Comment, Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence: The Need for a
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their counsel continue to languish in hopeless confusion.5  In
large measure, this confusion is due to the extreme difficulty of
keeping clearly in mind what happens evidentially when the issue
arises.
The purpose of this article is not to review the vast amount of
literature on the subject, nor to restate the fundamentals of char-
acter evidence.6 Rather, the objective is to examine the main
causes of the continuing confusion and to suggest a visual model
as an aid in resolving the difficult, recurring problems.
II. THE THEORY OF PRIOR ACT ADMISSIBILITY
Section 1101(a) of the California Evidence Code codifies the
traditional7 common law position forbidding the admission of "ev-
idence of a person's character" 8 to prove "conduct on a specified
Two-Step Analysis, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 635 (1976); Comment, A Proposed Analytical
Method for the Determination of the Admissibility of Other Offenses in California,
7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1960); Comment, Defining Standards for Determining the
Admissibility of Evidence Of Other Sex Offenses, 25 U.C.LA. L. REV. 261 (1977).
For numerous additional articles and annotations, see 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 1, at 404-08 to 404-411 (Rule 404 synopsis).
5. See People v. Thompson, 98 Cal. App. 3d 467, 473-74, 159 Cal. Rptr. 615, 619
(1979) (Jefferson, P. J.): "[T]he question of the admissibility of evidence that de-
fendant committed acts of misconduct on occasions other than the occasion of the
offense charged against him still presents one of the most troublesome and unset-
tled features that we face today in the field of criminal evidence." Cf. 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 404-45 ("the question of when evidence of a
particular criminal act may be admitted is so perplexing that the cases sometimes
seem as numerous 'as the sands of the sea,' and often cannot be reconciled.").
6. For textual treatments, see generally C. McConmicK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 186-195 (2d ed. 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 52-69 (3rd ed.
1940). The citations to this article are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Unfortu-
nately, the sheer number of often irreconcilable cases presents more of a barrier
to understanding than an aid. The text seeks to present this intractable subject of
prior bad acts in as simplistic a fashion as possible and to that end relies heavily
upon the works of recognized authorities in evidence.
7. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 194.
8. The "evidence" spoken of can take three different forms: testimony con-.
cerning the defendant's reputation, a personal opinion about the defendant, and
testimony that the defendant previously performed certain specific conduct. See
CAL. Evim. CODE § 1100 (West 1966); C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 6, § 186. Character,
as used here, means a defendant's "propensity or disposition to engage in a cer-
tain type of conduct." CAL. Evin. CODE § 1101 comment of Law Revision Commis-
sion. But cf. Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the California Rape
Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAi L. REV. 35, 48-49 (1980) ("people have all sorts of
'propensities' and 'dispositions'-mental or physical qualities, ideological commit-
ments, life-styles, compulsions, obsessions, habits, preferences, and drives--each
of which 'disposes' them to behave in certain ways, without necessarily rising to
the category of character traits.").
occasion." 9 Section 1101(b), on the other hand, makes clear that
subdivision (a) does not prohibit the admission of relevant prior
acts if the acts are relevant in some way other than to show the
defendant's "disposition to commit such acts."'1
A recent California Supreme Court case, People v. Thompson,"
was instructive as to the interpretation of section 1101. In that
case, the defendant was charged with felony-murder, robbery, and
burglary, but denied possessing the specific intent to steal.12 To
9. "Conduct" is defined as including "all active and passive behavior, both
verbal and nonverbal." CAL. EVID. CODE § 125 (West 1966). Section 1101 prohibits
the inference of specific conduct (at the time of the charged offense) that ration-
ally could be drawn from evidence that a defendant possesses a particular charac-
ter trait or disposition. See People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 317-18, 611 P.2d 883,
889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 295 (1980); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 comment of Law Revision
Commission; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 188. For example, if a man were
charged with shoplifting, evidence that he shoplifted on occasions other than the
date of the charged offense (whether before or after that date and irrespective of
whether he was arrested or convicted) would tend to establish that he possessed a
propensity (or character trait) for theft in general. From this supposed propensity
for theft, a further inference could be drawn that the man would act in conformity
with this propensity and steal on occasions other than those already proved, such
as at the time of the charged theft. To the extent that the man is more disposed to
commit theft on the date charged, as compared to the population in general, this
disposition is relevant on the issue of his guilt. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 6,
§ 185 (discussing relevancy in general). Of course, this two-step inferential pro-
cess, from other thefts to propensity and then from propensity to guilt on the
charged offense, is at best tenuous. Both inferences are relatively weak, and, of
course, there is considerable risk that a jury will simply consider the defendant to
be an undesirable person because of his other thefts and convict him of the
charged crime irrespective of their certainty of his guilt regarding this offense. See
People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 317, 611 P.2d at 889-90, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96; 1 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 194. This risk is substantially more acute if the defend-
ant is charged with a sex crime. Cf. People v. Meiriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 395, 426 P.2d
161, 174, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1967) (a sex offense "is so thoroughly repugnant to the
average person that it can breed that righteous outrage which is the enemy of ob-
jective fact finding"), overruled on other grounds, People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.
3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
For a brief summary of character evidence in general and the operation of re-
lated California Evidence Code provisions, see Letwin, supra note 8, at 44-52.
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1966), supra note 3. See C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 6, § 190; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 306. There is, however, a certain
linguistic ambiguity between the first two subdivisions of section 1101. The word
"conduct" is used in subdivision (a) in reference to both previous behavior and
the charged behavior, while the words "act" and "acts" are used in subdivision (b)
in reference to previous behavior and a disposition to commit such behavior.
While it could be argued that the word "act" is narrower in scope than "conduct,"
relating only to physical behavior and not to an accompanying mental state, it
seems probable that, at least in this context, the words are intended to be synony-
mous. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 comment of Law Revision Commission ("Sec-
tion 1101 does not prohibit the admission of evidence of misconduct when it is
offered as evidence of some other fact in issue,. . . Subdivision (b) of Section 1101
makes this clear." (emphasis added)). Cf. FED. R. EviD. § 404 (using the phrase
"acted in conformity" in both subdivisions (a) and (b) (emphasis added)).
11. 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980).
12. Id. at 313, 611 P.2d at 887, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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prove intent,13 the prosecutor introduced evidence that the de-
fendant had also robbed the Breakers Restaurant thirteen days
after the charged crimes.14 In holding the admission of the rob-
bery evidence erroneous, the court stated:
[tihe inference of a criminal disposition may not be used to establish any
link in the chain of logic connecting the uncharged offense with the mate-
rial fact [in this case, the intent to steal]. If no theory of relevancy can be
established without this pitfall, the evidence of the uncharged offense is
simply inadmissible.
1 5
While the court cited no precedent for this proposition,16 it was
nonetheless a correct exposition of evidence theory.' 7
A.
In deciding Thompson, the supreme court had in mind a rele-
vancy concept independent of reliance on character or disposi-
tion. While not articulated clearly, the court implicitly relied on
the so called "doctrine of chances."'18 The premise of this doctrine
13. Depending on the case, prior bad acts can logically be relevant on two dis-
tinct ultimate issues: the required mental state (intent) and the identity of the
perpetrator. See B. JEFFERSON, supra note 2. It is essential to keep this distinction
clearly in mind as the standards governing prior act admissibility differ somewhat
depending upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered. See notes 40-43 in-
fra and accompanying text.
14. 27 Cal. 3d at 314, 611 P.2d at 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 294. See note 2 supra, acts
which occur after the charged offense can be relevant to show previous conduct.
15. Id. at 317, 611 P.2d at 889, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 295 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
16. The court's footnote to the statement quoted in the text did not address
the question of relevance in relation to disposition. Instead, the footnote made
clear that section 1101 does not exclude reliance on all "intermediate facts," such
as motive or modus operandi. See notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text. It fur-
ther pointed out that prior act evidence falling within the terms of section 1101(b)
is not automatically admissible; it still must satisfy the rules of admissibility relat-
ing to general relevancy and discretionary exclusion. 27 Cal. 3d at 317 n.17, 611
P.2d at 889 n.17, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 295 n.17 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 210, 350, 352).
17. Cf. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 190, at 447. "The rule is that the prose-
cution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the
evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a
probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal
character." Id.
18. This doctrine relies on the aspect of "similarity" between the charged of-
fense and the uncharged offenses. It was upon just such an analysis that Thomp-
son was decided.
The theories of relevance advanced in this case are premised on the
contention that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably
harbors the same intent in each instance. Therefore, if the circumstances
of the Breakers Restaurant robbery showed that appellant had an intent
to steal, then the presence of similar circumstances in La Habra [the
place of the charged offense I would suggest that he had the same intent at
is that while an abnormal fact (or unintentional act) might take
place once, or perhaps even twice, the more times such a fact oc-
curs, the less likely it is that the fact is abnormal (or an act truly
unintentional).19 For example, if a relatively minor, though
favorable, error in addition were found in a taxpayer's income tax
return, it would be considered by most to be a casual mistake. If,
however, a similar error was found in each of the preceding five
years, the possibility of casual mistake would be greatly dimin-
ished, and, conversely, the possibility of deliberate fraud greatly
increased. 20
For validity, the doctrine of chances requires similarity of oc-
currences. 21 To the extent that prior and charged acts are dissim-
ilar, there is little, if any, probative value derived from the prior
act independent of disposition.22 Thus, if an accused were
charged with the sale of heroin, it would be erroneous to receive
the time of the shootings. . . .This claimed similarity is not borne out by
the facts.
27 Cal. 3d at 319-20, 611 P.2d at 891, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
The theory of the doctrine of chances is applicable when the issue is intent. 2 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 302. When the issue is knowledge, the proper theory of
prior act relevance is premised upon the probabilities relating to prior notice. Id.
§ 301. Other theories, such as modus operandi, apply when the issue is identity.
See id. § 306; note 41 infra.
19. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 302. Put another way, "similar results do not
usually occur through abnormal causes." Id.
20. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 683 (5th Cir. 1941). An excellent illus-
tration of the doctrine of chances can be found in the panel opinion of United
States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 582 F.2d 898 (1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). Judge Goldberg, writing for the majority, hypotheti-
cally considered a man on trial for shoving a customs officer and charged with will-
fully interfering with the performance of the officer's duties. 555 F.2d at 495 (citing
United States v. Sanchez, 482 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1973), from which the hypothetical
was taken). In this example, the defendant claimed he did not mean to shove the
officer. In order to prove the required intent, the government introduced evidence
of the defendant's prior act of assaulting a bartender. While the assault on the
bartender was relevant to show that the defendant did not likely stumble acciden-
tally against the customs officer, its relevance was premised primarily on the fact
that the defendant was a bellicose person because he assaulted a bartender and
was thus likely to harbor the same aggressive attitude or disposition in pushing
other people. Id. at 495.
Judge Goldberg went on to contrast the above situation with one in which the
defendant, on two previous occasions, shoved customs officers at other border
checkpoints.
Although the conclusion that he intended to assault the customs officer on
the occasion charged is by no means certain, we might view the prior and
charged offenses as sufficiently similar to allow the jury to make the infer-
ence if it chooses to do so. Our reasoning is simple. The defendant might
unintentionally have shoved one customs officer, but the likelihood that
he would shove two or three accidentally is sharply reduced. We might, to
be sure, have an unusually clumsy fellow, but the odds are we do not.
Id. at 495-96, cited favorably in, 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 302.
21. 555 F.2d at 496; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 302.
22. Cf. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 321 n.24, 611 P.2d at 892 n.24, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 298 n.24: "When similarity of behavior is critical to the chain of relevance,
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evidence of his prior use of marijuana in order to show the re-
quired intent.23 Such a dissimilar act, while somewhat relevant
on the question of intent,24 is inadmissible as evidence primarily
because of the inference of bad character (disposition) which
could be drawn from the previous marijuana usage by the
defendant.25
The Thompson decision, however, did more than just adopt the
doctrine of chances for use in intent cases; 26 it also clearly for-
bade (presumably in all cases) any reliance whatsoever upon evi-
dence of bad disposition. 27 This strong affirmation of the rule
excluding character evidence now casts serious doubt upon the
many previous appellate decisions which loosely approved the ad-
mission of prior bad acts.28
it would normally seem appropriate to compare the overall circumstances of each
incident, not merely a truncated portion thereof."
23. Enriquez v. United States, 314 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1963), cited in J. WIGMORE,
supra note 6, § 302 (Supp. 1977).
24. The reasoning would be that people who use marijuana are more likely to
use, as well as sell, other drugs as compared to people who do not use drugs at all.
25. When there is some similarity between the offenses, there will also exist
some probative value based upon the doctrine of chances. However, the determi-
native issue is whether this probative value, properly premised upon similarity,
will be substantial enough to outweigh the prejudicial effect premised upon dispo-
sition. See notes 39-51 infra and accompanying text. It is the latter, which is al-
ways present in prior act cases, that must be overcome before admissibility is
proper. See People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 317-18, 611 P.2d at 890, 165 Cal. Rptr.
at 296.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. Evidence that an individual intended to steal car keys on one occasion
does not, by itself, substantially tend to prove that he intended to steal
them on a second occasion. The only tendency it establishes is the imper-
missible inference that he has a "disposition to commit" such crimes.
Since the Evidence Code specifically forbids the admission of uncharged
offenses to prove such a disposition, even as a waystation to proving in-
tent, the trial court erred in admitting this evidence.
27 Cal. 3d at 321, 611 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (emphasis added).
28. Much of the history of the Section 1101 (b) noncharacter categories is a
history of evasion and game playing in which evidence that is essentially
of character is disingenuously offered and received as though it were
something else-enabling the prosecution to benefit from the juror's illicit
response to the defendant's 'bad character.'
Letwin, supra note 8, at 51-52 (footnote omitted). This "evasion and game playing"
has several variations. For example, the legitimate theory of admissibility can be
misconstrued, as in People v. Massey, 196 Cal. App. 2d 230, 235, 16 Cal. Rptr. 402,
405-06 (1961), where the court labeled a tenuous modus operandi situation as one
involving intent. A prior act can be offered as being "similar" to the charged
crime, but where the similarity is more superficial than distinctive. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Perez, 65 Cal. 2d 615, 422 P.2d 597, 55 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1967). In Perez the de-
fendant was charged with several nighttime robberies of Sacramento businesses.
All of these crimes involved two or three men, some of whom covered their faces
There remains, however, considerable practical difficulty in de-
with a glove or cloth. The supreme court upheld admission of evidence against the
defendant of a prior Sacramento robbery of a business at night in which the de-
fendant was involved and in which two men wore stockings over their heads and
one carried a rifle.
In addition, a prior act which, upon analysis, is not properly relevant to any dis-
puted issue in the case could be offered. See, e.g., People v. Greene, 34 Cal. App.
3d 622, 638, 110 Cal. Rptr. 160, 170 (1973), where the defendant claimed an alibi de-
fense, but the court approved the admission of similar prior acts because "[t Ihere
was clearly an issue as to the motive and intent manifested by the defendant if the
jurors believed the account of either of the victims .... ." The problem with this
analysis is that, given the alibi defense, the defendant simply was not contesting
the fact that the (arguably unknown) perpetrator of the crime had the requisite
intent. The defendant's claim was that he was elsewhere, thereby implicitly con-
ceding that the perpetrator (whoever he or she was) must have had whatever in-
tent was reasonably inferable from the physical conduct described by the victims.
To assume, as the court did, that intent will somehow become an issue if the ju-
rors believe the victim's testimony, is to inject into the case a defense which the
defendant has not asserted. "The People are, of course, entitled to offer evidence
on every issue in the case, but the notion that a plea of not guilty automatically
entitles the prosecution to use evidence of other crimes to prove an element of the
crime charged is incorrect ... ." People v. Gregg, 266 Cal. App. 2d 389, 391, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 920, 922 (1968). But see People v. Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 639, 477 P.2d 421, 436,
91 Cal. Rptr. 397, 412 (1970). Rather, the propriety of prior bad act evidence often
is best assessed at the time of rebuttal. See also People v. Todd, 1 Cal. App. 3d 547,
552-53, 81 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869-70 (1969). Only then can the trial court accurately de-
termine if the evidence "is offered upon an issue which will ultimately prove to be
material to the People's case .... People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 775, 457 P.2d
841, 849, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1969) (emphasis added). See 2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note
1, § 404[09].
The situation involving the need to postpone introducing the prior act evidence
until rebuttal arises primarily when the evidence is relevant solely on the issue of
the defendant's mental state. The reason is that the evidence concerns something
inherently under the defendant's tactical control-his decision whether or not to
deny that he possessed the mental state required for the crime. On the other
hand, prior act evidence which is relevant on the issue of identity can safely be
introduced during the prosecutor's case-in-chief. In this latter situation, the prose-
cutor can reasonably assume, absent a contrary stipulation by the defense, that
the defendant's plea of not guilty means that he will deny doing the charged act
(i.e., contest identity).
Of course, when the evidence concerns only a mental state, thus suggesting that
the prosecutor should postpone introducing the prior act evidence until rebuttal,
there is the risk that the defendant might preclude rebuttal by resting without of-
fering any evidence. In order to obviate this problem, a prudent prosecutor might
wish to obtain a prior defense stipulation on the questionable issue. Cf. People v.
Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 152, 616 P.2d 826, 831, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 849 (1980). "[If a de-
fendant offers to admit the existence of an element of a charged offense, the prose-
cutor must accept that offer and refrain from introducing evidence of other crimes
to prove that element to the jury." Id. Alternatively, a prosecutor should request
assurance from the trial court that it will allow a reopening of the prosecutor's
case. Only if both of these approaches fail should there be an attempt to intro-
duce in the case-in-chief prior bad act evidence that is relevant to mental state.
Admissibility will, however, still depend on other factors. See note 50 infra (quo-
tation from People v. Schader). For a good attempt to reconcile the cases involv-
ing prior bad acts and the problem of "anticipated defenses," see People v. Perez,
42 Cal. App. 3d 760, 117 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1974).
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termining exactly when prior acts do and do not depend upon the
disposition of the defendant for their relevance.2 9 The supreme
court in Thompson alluded several times to "intermediate facts,"30
and, upon analysis, it is a difference in the nature of these facts
which frequently determines the issue of admissibility. As an aid
in visualizing these intermediate steps and in thinking through
the inferential process involved in prior act cases, the following
diagram is suggested:3 1
29. The effort to apply the distinction in practice has proved one of the
most troubling problems currently confronting criminal courts. One rea-
son is practical, the other theoretical. The practical reason is that a given
item of evidence may have both a permissible and an impermissible use;
it is then necessary to decide at what point the one predominates over the
other, often a difficult matter. The theoretical reason is that some
noncharacter uses-particularly some types of evidence offered under the
heading of modus operandi-are in their nature exceedingly difficult to
distinguish from the forbidden kinds of dispositional (character) evidence
Letwin, supra note 8, at 51 n.56.
30. 27 Cal. 3d at 315-17, 611 P.2d at 888-89, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95.
31. The diagram illustrates an important observation made by Wigmore and
explicitly relied upon in Thompson, id. at 316 n.16, 611 P.2d at 889 n.16, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 295 n.16:
The impulse to argue from A's former conduct directly to his doing or
not doing of the deed charged is perhaps a natural one. But it will always
be found, upon analysis of the process of reasoning, that there is involved
in it a hidden intermediary step of some sort, resting on a second infer-
ence of character, motive, plan, or the like.
This intermediate step is always implicit, and must be brought out.
1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 192, at 642.
co
.- 4:;
U2
a)
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The "hidden intermediate step [s]" 32 are indicated in the center
of the diagram and help make clear that the list of admissible pur-
poses found within section 1101(b) "are not really all on the same
plane."33 Rather, some are intermediate inferences,34 while
others are ultimate elements of the charged crime.35
Notice that if a prior act is relevant in a case, it must logically
pass through an intermediate stage, as indicated in the diagram
(H).36 However, the key to determining admissibility of prior acts
as evidence is whether, and to what extent, there is a route of rel-
evancy through an intermediate step other than II. C. (Charac-
ter/Disposition to do Prior Act(s)). If there is, the inference from
the prior act (I) to the charged crime (III) is permitted. 37 How-
ever, if an inference cannot be routed through II. A. (Probabilistic
Inferences) or II. B. (Non-Character Inferences), the evidence is
barred under section 1101.38
C.
While the diagram can be of visual assistance in tracing
through the necessary inferential steps, it cannot aid in resolving
what is ultimately the most difficult question: exactly when are
prior acts "sufficiently similar" to qualify for admission?39 Part of
the difficulty in making this determination inheres in the fact that
32. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 192, at 642.
33. Stone, supra note 4, at 1026 n.190. Moreover, the listed categories are not
the only theories of admissibility; they are merely illustrative of the possibilities.
See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 6, § 190, at 448-51.
34. "Motive, opportunity, plan, scheme, design, and modus operandi are exam-
ples of intermediate facts." People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 315 n.14, 611 P.2d at
888 n.14, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 294 n.14.
35. "Intent, absence of mistake, and identity are facts in issue--facta pro-
banda." Stone, supra note 4, at 1026 n.190 (emphasis in original).
36. "[W]henever resort is had to'a person's past conduct or acts as the basis
of inference to a subsequent act, it must always be done intermediately through
another inference." 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 192, at 642 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Cf. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 315 n.14, 611 P.2d at 888 n.14, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 294 n.14. "Evidence of an uncharged offense offered to prove an intermedi-
ate fact is not necessarily material. The materiality requirement is satisfied only if
the intermediate fact tends logically and reasonably to prove an ultimate fact
which is in dispute." Id. (emphasis in original).
37. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1101(b), supra note 3.
38. See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
39. "It is just this requirement of similarity which leaves so much room for dif-
ference of opinion and accounts for the bewildering variances of rulings in the dif-
ferent jurisdictions and even in the same jurisdiction and in cases of the same
offense." 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 302, at 246.
the requisite degree of similarity differs depending on whether
the ultimate objective is to prove intent or identity.40 Situations
involving identity (i.e., when the issue is who physically did the
charged act) often require that prior acts of the defendant bear
highly distinctive common marks to those of the perpetrator.4 1
40. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666, 668, 198 S.W.2d 969, 970-71 (1947).
Note that prior acts of the defendant can never be used to establish the occur-
rence of the actus reus itself. State v. Donaluzzi, 94 Vt. 142, 146, 109 A. 57, 59 (1920).
The reason for this is that inferences from prior conduct to the existence of pres-
ently charged conduct rests solely upon dispositional reasoning. See note 31
supra and accompanying diagram.
41. Highly distinctive common marks are required when the theory of admis-
sibility is that of so-called modus operandi. B. JEFFERSON, supra note 2, § 21.5, at
270-71. The theory is that if the defendant on trial has in fact previously commit-
ted a crime in a highly distinctive way and this same distinctiveness was mani-
fested by the perpetrator of the charged crime, logic dictates that the defendant
must also have been the one who committed the charged crime. See People v.
Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 204, 454 P.2d 700, 705, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 809 (1969); C. McCOR-
MICK, supra note 6, § 190 at 449. For an excellent discussion of what constitutes
highly distinctive common marks, see People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 523 P.2d
267, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975), overruled on other
grounds, People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
The common marks requirement, while applicable to modus operandi, does not
necessarily extend to the other theories pertinent to proving identity. For exam-
ple, if the theory of admissibility is motive, as when a husband takes out a large
life insurance policy on his wife and is later charged with her murder, relevance
exists irrespective of any similarity. In the illustration, the prior act is the taking
out of life insurance and the charged act is the act of killing.
Analogously, if a defendant is charged with robbery, it might be proper to intro-
duce evidence that the defendant committed a dissimilar prior burglary. Rele-
vance may exist if the burglary were to show something other than disposition,
such as opportunity (as when the crimes were committed close together in time
and location) or preparation (as when the defendant stole materials later used in
the robbery). G. LuLy, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 132-33 (1978).
Another theory of admissibility, that of common plan, scheme, or design, is often
confused with modus operandi. Cf. People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 747, 523 P.2d
267, 272, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 472 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975), overruled on
other grounds, People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979)
(other highly distinctive rapes "admitted for the purpose of showing his identity
through a common plan"). Analytically, common plan is a distinct category. It en-
visions an overall objective whose accomplishment requires the doing of several
distinct acts, such as in a conspiracy. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 6, § 190, at
448-49; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 304, at 202 (the object is "to prove a pre-ex-
isting design, system, plan, or scheme, directed forwards to the doing of [the
charged] act"). For example, showing that a defendant previously bribed county
supervisors A, B, and C to vote for project X is very probative on the issue of who
bribed supervisor D (the charged crime) if four favorable votes were needed for
the passage of X. See People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 661-65, 112 P. 281, 288-90 (1910).
The California Supreme Court has recognized that common plan "perhaps more
accurately implies-'a larger continuing plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the
present crime on trial is a part.'" People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 205, 454 P.2d 700,
706, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810 (1969). Nevertheless, the court continues to use the
phrase "common design or plan" to encompass both modus operandi and situa-
tions involving a larger continuing plan. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 464-65,
573 P.2d 433, 436, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218 (1978).
While the theory of modus operandi requires acts bearing highly distinctive
common marks, admissibility by common plan, when properly labeled, requires
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On the other hand, in situations involving intent (i.e., where it is
taken as given that the charged defendant physically did the
act),42
the mind asks only for something that will negative innocent intent; and
the mere prior occurrence of an act similar in its gross features-i.e., the
same doer, and the same sort of act, but not necessarily the same mode of
acting nor the same sufferer-may suffice for that purpose.
43
similarity of perhaps an even stricter sort: "such a concurrence of common fea-
tures that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general
plan of which they are the individual manifestations." 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6,
§ 304, at 202 (emphasis omitted). Of course, acts indicating a common plan also
may be relevant to prove intent. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d at 465, 573 P.2d at
436, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (1978); G. LnLy, supra, at 133-34. But where intent is the
desired inference, as opposed to identity, it can be shown short of proving the
strict concurrence of features otherwise required for common plan. This is aptly
illustrated by Wigmore:
[01 n a charge of assault with intent to rape, where the intent alone is dis-
puted, a prior assault on the previous day upon the same woman, or even
upon another member of her family, might have probative value, but if the
assault itself is disputed, and the defendant attempts, for example, to
show an alibi, the same facts might be of little or no value, and it might be
necessary to go further and to show (for example) that the defendant on
the same day, with a confederate guarding the house, assaulted other wo-
men in the same family who escaped, leaving the complainant as the only
woman accessible to him for his purpose .... [W]here the very act is the
object of proof, and is desired to be inferred from a plan or system, the
combination of common features that will suggest a common plan as their
explanation involves so much higher a grade of similarity [than needed to
show intent] as to constitute a substantially new and distinct test.
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 304, at 249-51.
42. [TJhe standard framework for admission of evidence of other crimes
[to show intent] is if there is no doubt that defendant had committed an
act, but some question as to his intent in doing so [in] all the cases in
which other crimes evidence has been introduced to show the intent be-
hind an act, there has been some independent evidence that the act was
committed.
People v. Guerrero, 16 Cal. 3d 719, 726, 548 P.2d 366, 370, 129 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170
(1976).
43. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 304, at 204.
"Intent," as used here, is a catch-all word designating the required mental state
(mens rea) of the charged crime. As a practical matter, prior act admissibility
problems normally will not arise unless the charged crime requires purpose,
knowledge, or something similar, such as lack of mistake or knowledge. Crimes
requiring lesser mental states (e.g., recklessness or negligence) basically involve
risk creation and will rarely present a route of relevance independent of disposi-
tion. For discussions of the distinctions between the various "intent" words, see
generally W. LA FAVE & A. Scovr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 195-98
(1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 300, at 192-93; Roth, General vs. Specific In-
tent: A Time for Terminological Understanding in California, 7 Pepperdine L.
Rev. 67, 68-74, 76-77 nn.50-51 (1979).
Note also that motive is an intermediate fact which can be relevant to prove ei-
ther identity or intent. For example, in reference to intent, if a man had a reason
to kill his wife, as when he takes out a large life insurance policy on her life, it
Still, in the intent situation, the nagging question of exactly how
similar the acts must be remains.4 A precise answer probably is
not possible, 45 but the physical components of the prior and
charged offenses should at least be substantially alike in order to
create significant probative value under the doctrine of chances. 46
Anything short of substantial similarity will attenuate the allowa-
ble probative thrust and, accordingly, magnify the prejudicial ef-
fect of the inference based upon disposition, thereby making it
inadmissible as evidence of intent.47
Indeed, in all prior act cases, the question of admissibility ulti-
mately comes down to a weighing process.48 The admissible in-
tends to show that when he killed her he acted with malice aforethought rather
than in self-defense.
44. See note 39 supra.
45. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 1, 404[08], at 404-45 ("IT]hough
it is easy to criticize any given case, it is impossible to verbalize a formula which
can be applied with any precision."). Cf. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 302, at 201
("It is hopeless to attempt to reconcile the precedents ... for too much depends
on the tendency of the court in dealing with a flexible principle.").
46. See United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d at 496-97. "It must be seen that the
entire strength of the inference rests on the similarity between the prior and the
charged offense .... We thus abstract from prior and charged offenses a level of
generality at which similarity will retain substantial probative value." Id. (foot-
note omitted). As indicated in note 20 supra, Judge Goldberg's analysis of the
doctrine of chances was favorably cited in 2 J. WIGMORE, upra note 6, § 302, at 247.
Cf. People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 775, 457 P.2d at 849-50, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10. "In
determining relevance, the trial court... must examine the precise elements of
similarity between the offenses with respect to the issue for which the evidence is
proffered and satisfy itself that each link of the chain of inference between the for-
mer and the latter is reasonably strong." Id. (footnote omitted).
47. "Since 'substantial prejudicial effect [is] inherent in [prior act) evidence,'
uncharged offenses are admissible only if they have substantial probative value.
If there is any doubt, the evidence should be excluded." People v. Thompson, 27
Cal. 3d at 318, 611 P.2d at 890, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
48. People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 774, 457 P.2d at 848, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
A related issue in all prior act admissibility situations is the standard of proof
required as to the very existence of the other acts. The rule in California is that
the acts may be shown merely by a preponderance of substantial evidence. Peo-
ple v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 187 n.15, 449 P.2d 198, 208 n.15, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262, 272
n.15, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969); B. WrrKiN, CALnImFO'N EvDENCE § 344 (2d ed.
1966). Some federal courts of appeal have held the standard should be "clear and
convincing evidence," but there is no clear consensus. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 1, $ 404110]. While there may be logic in the statement that "facts
regarding another offense are simply evidentiary facts to be considered along with
other evidence in the case on the question of knowledge, plan, or intent," People v.
Mendoza, 37 Cal. App. 3d 717, 724, 112 Cal. Rptr. 565, 569 (1974), a low standard of
proof severely undermines the premise upon which prior act evidence is admitted:
that the charged defendant has in fact committed the prior act.
The problem is particularly acute when the theory of admissibility is modus
operandi, i.e., when the prior acts must be so unusual and distinctive as to be "like
a signature." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 190, at 449. Indeed, if one were to
compare arguably unknown handwriting with a sample of known handwriting for
purposes of determining if a certain person wrote both, one would reasonably ex-
pect that the "known" sample would be in the nature of an exemplar, i.e., a writing
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ference (based upon the doctrine of chances or other permissible
intermediate step) must outweigh the always present inadmissi-
ble inference (based on bad disposition or character) .9 For this
weighing to be performed accurately, a constant analytical sepa-
ration of the various routes of relevancy is essential.5 0 If clarity of
thought is not maintained, it is extremely easy for courts to admit
prior bad acts under the pervasive sway of their strong probative
concededly belonging to an identified individual. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1418 (West
1966) (requires comparison by expert witness with a writing "proved to be genu-
ine to the satisfaction of the court"). Yet to the extent that prior acts are not
proved by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, they are like samples of handwrit-
ing whose authenticity has not yet been proved genuine. "To the extent that there
is a serious question about whether the accused committed another crime, the
probative force of the entire line of proof is seriously attenuated." 2 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, s-upra note 1, at 404-55.
49. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 318, 611 P.2d at 890, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
This weighing process is sound. It furthers the legislative purpose in § 1101(a) of
the California Evidence Code of protecting the accused from the tendency of a
jury to convict a defendant "'not because he is believed guilty of the present
charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from the other offenses."' Id.
The court cited § 352 of the California Evidence Code as authority for its proposi-
tion, id., but this reliance was misplaced. Section 352 provides: "The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues,
or of misleading the jury." CAL. EvD. CODE § 352 (West 1966). Applying § 352 to
the prior bad act situation produces a completely different and unintended bal-
ance. The trial court could exclude evidence having some non-character basis only
if its probative value was substantially outweighed by a substantial danger of un-
due prejudice from the inference based upon character. Thus, if there were an
even balance between the inferences, § 352 would not bar its admission-a result
contrary to the express language in Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 318, 611 P.2d at 890,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 296. Some federal courts, however, have looked to § 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (analogous to CAL. Ev.D. CODE § 352) and held that its
terms should be literally applied during the weighing process in prior bad act
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
50. The suggested diagram, supra note 31 and accompanying text, will assist
in "seeing" the various ways in which the proffered evidence is relevant. Cf. Peo-
ple v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 775, 457 P.2d at 849-50, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10 (footnotes
omitted):
Before permitting the jury to hear evidence of other offenses the court
must ascertain that the evidence (a) 'tends logically, naturally and by rea-
sonable inference' to prove the issue upon which it is offered; (b) is of-
fered upon an issue which will ultimately prove to be material to the
People's case; and (c) is not merely cumulative with respect to other evi-
dence which the People may use to prove the same issue. In determining
relevance, the trial court ... must examine the precise elements of simi-
larity between the offenses with respect to the issue for which the evi-
dence is proffered and satisfy itself that each link of the chain of inference
between the former and the latter is reasonably strong.
value.51 The correct solution, however, depends not merely on
relevancy, but upon the probative strength of an inference in-
dependent of any connection to character or disposition.
III. DETERMINING ADMISSIBILITY: A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
In order to correctly decide prior act evidence problems, it is
necessary to follow some sort of analytical checklist.52 Failure to
do this can only further blur the often obscure distinction be-
tween proper admissibility and inadmissibility. Using the above
diagram as an aid,53 the following four step analysis is suggested:
(1) Determine accurately the disputed ultimate issues in the
case. For example, if the defendant claims an alibi, intent of the
perpetrator simply is not an issue.54
(2) Determine if the prior act has any non-character relevancy.
Prior act evidence will, of course, always be relevant to show
something about the character (disposition) of the defendant. 55
However, to be admissible, the prior act must also be relevant to
something "other than [the defendant's] disposition to commit
such acts."5 6 These possible "other things" are the various non-
character intermediate steps enumerated in the center of the
diagram.57
(3) Determine if any non-character inferences further lead to a
disputed issue. (This third step is but a synthesis of the first
two.) Note that none of the non-character inferences are relevant
to prove the actus reus of a crime, although inferences from char-
acter frequently are.5 8
.(4) Determine if the probative value of such non-character in-
ferences out-weigh the prejudicial effect of the character inference.
Even if a prior act is relevant to show a non-character intermedi-
ate inference from which a further inference can be drawn to a
disputed issue, the strength of this double inference must be bal-
anced against the always present, and also double, inference
51. See note 28 supra.
52. A similar four-step approach also was suggested in Comment, A Proposed
Analytical Method for the Determination of Admissibility of Evidence of Other Of-
fenses in California, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 482 (1960). That comment, while now
somewhat dated, remains an excellent analysis of the problems connected with
prior act admissibility.
53. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
54. Cf. People v. Greene, 34 Cal. App. 3d 622, 638, 110 Cal. Rptr. 160, 170 (1973)
(defendant claimed alibi, but court admitted evidence to prove motive and intent);
see note 28 supra for discussion of this case.
55. See note 25 supra.
56. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1966).
57. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 40 supra.
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based upon character.5 9 Only if the non-character inference sub-
stantially outweighs the prejudice inherent in the character infer-
ence will the prior act be admissible. 60 Moreover, the strength of
many non-character inferences is greatly affected by the degree of
similarity between the prior act and the charged offense. 61
IV. CONCLUSION
From the above discussion and the reported cases, it is obvious
that determining the admissibility of prior bad acts is an extraor-
dinarily difficult and complex task. The reason for this is that
there are several diverse factors to be taken into account and
their relationship to one another varies depending on the precise
facts of each case. Consequently, generalizations of law are of lit-
tle help in deciding the admissibility of evidence in specific
situations.
In order to put the various factors involved in prior act analysis
into proper perspective, it is essential to keep the factors clearly
and constantly in mind. To this end, it is suggested that the
reader utilize the diagram set forth in Part II above. It will visu-
ally reinforce the constant dichotomy between relevancy based
upon disposition (character) and relevancy based upon one or
more non-dispositional theories. Moreover, because the subject is
so elusive, no decision as to prior act admissibility should be
made without following some systematic approach. A recom-
mended four-part step-by-step approach has been outlined in Part
III above and its use will assure a rational and conscientious ef-
fectuation of the legal requirements contained within section 1101
of the California Evidence Code.
59. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 49 supra.
61. See notes 39-51 supra and accompanying text.

